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In this paper, I argue that the anti-reductionist thesis supports a case for the uselessness of 
intentional idioms in the interpretation of highly flexible, self-modifying agents that I refer to as 
“hyperplastic” agents. An agent is hyperplastic if it can make arbitrarily fine changes to any part of 
its functional or physical structure without compromising its agency or its capacity for 
hyperplasticity. Using Davidson’s anomalous monism (AM) as an exemplar of anti-reductionism, I 
argue that AM implies that no hyperplastic could use intentional psychology to predict its future 
intentional states or the psychological consequences of self-alterations. This is because AM implies 
there would be no laws allowing the hyperplastic to infer the psychological consequences of its self-
alterations. This implies that no generalisations linking current to future psychological states would 
hold either - these could always be defeated by a self-intervention carried out by the hyperplastic. 
By the same token, neither hyperplastics nor human interpreters could use intentional psychology 
to understand the behaviour of other hyperplastics. Radical interpretation of hyperplastic agents - if 
such there were - would be impossible.  It follows that were humans to become hyperplastic 
posthumans, intentional psychology would have to be instrumentally eliminated because neither 
the capacity nor the linguistic idiom for attributing propositional attitudes would retain predictive or 
hermeneutic utility. 
Anti-reductionist physicalists or materialists deny that psychology can be theoretically 
reduced to physics but allow physics sovereignty concerning what exists. Anti-
reductionist arguments vary but a common line of attack against reductionism is that 
psychology expresses rational or normative relationships between mental states; not 
causal or functional relationships of the kind expressed in theories of natural science. 
Thus in Sellars “Two Images” account physics and natural science tells us what exists 
but humans still encounter themselves in a normatively structured “space of reasons”. 
Donald Davidson refers to his own version of this position as "anomalous monism" (AM): 
"Anomalous monism resembles materialism in its claim that all events are physical, but 
rejects the thesis, usually considered essential to materialism, that mental phenomena 
can be given purely physical explanations. Anomalous monism shows an ontological 
bias only in that it allows the possibility that not all events are mental, while insisting that 
all events are physical" (Davidson 2001: 214) 
Davidson's account seeks to reconcile three claims that appear to be in tension: 1) that 
mental events causally interact with physical events; 2) that causal relations occur only 
where the events in question are covered by strict deterministic laws; 3) "that there are 
no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and 
explained (the Anomalism of the Mental)." 
Davidson aims to do this by arguing from the claim that the existence of causal 
relationships between events only implies that there is some true description of the 
relationship expressing a strict nomic relationship. The reconciliation is possible because 
causal relations obtain between token singular events while laws are linguistically 
expressed generalisations. Mental events can be causally related to one other or to non-
mental events. 
But, according to Davidson, causality is nomological only in that where two events are 
causally related, they have linguistic descriptions that express a law. It does not follow 
that "that every true singular statement of causality instantiates a law" (215). Thus a 
statement like "Helen's belief that Justin was murdered was caused by her seeing blood 
in the kitchen" adverts to a law like relationship between a token of blood in the kitchen 
and a token belief about murder but does not state it. The law-like relationship, for 
Davidson, would have to be expressed in terms of the states and dynamics of a physical 
system which allowed a deterministic inference about a future state - her belief token - 
again rendered in some physicalistic idiom. 
Claim 3) Follows, Davidson thinks, if mental states are those addressed in propositional 
attitude ascriptions and that such ascriptions depend holistically on overall assessments 
of the rationality and cognizance of agents in their world. In the space of reasons, where 
propositional attitudes are ascribed to persons, it is always possible to revise attributions 
in the interests of overall cogency. There can be no single translation scheme that pre-
empts all the evidence that could be relevant to such ascriptions (222-223). Thus 
whereas the theories in which physical regularities are stated must be closed to allow 
the formulation of exceptionless laws (homonomic) the language of propositional attitude 
ascription is necessarily open to multiple idioms or “heteronomic” (219): 
“The heteronomic character of general statements linking the mental and the physical 
traces back to this central role of translation in the description of all prepositional 
attitudes, and to the indeterminacy of translation. There are no strict psychophysical 
laws because of the disparate commitments of the mental and physical schemes. It is a 
feature of physical reality that physical change can be explained by laws that connect it 
with other changes and conditions physically described. It is a feature of the mental that 
the attribution of mental phenomena must be responsible to the background of reasons, 
beliefs, and intentions of the individual.”(222) 
In Nagelian terms, it would be impossible to formulate true bridge laws between a 
reducing theory in some physical idiom and a reduced psychological theory because the 
intentional side the biconditional could always be revised in the light of holistic 
considerations irrelevant to the “physical side”. Thus type-type psychophysical reduction 
appears impossible. Note that an analogous result is obtainable if we view the space of 
reasons as structured by implicit norms irreducible to behavioral regularities. 
Of course, not all accounts of reduction require bridge laws between reduced and 
reducing theories, or treat theories as interpreted sets of sentences. It is still open to the 
reductionist to argue for a different form of reduction (Bickle 1993: 222-4). It is also open 
to the reductionist to argue that psychology is not peculiar in being inexpressible "as sets 
of generalizations" - this being true of all scientific theories (226) - or in being open to 
extra-theoretical idioms in which to describe their contexts of application to real systems. 
Maybe no theory (physical or otherwise) is truly heteronomic. 
However, in the argument that follows I will suppose that Davidson's anomalism is right, 
or, at least, that his account can be rectified in a form that is proof against 
neoreductionist assaults. 
So let us assume that the psychological perspective in which agents have beliefs and 
desires and utter meaningful statements is conceptually irreducible (as Sellarsians say) 
to the scientific image of the world as a causal-physical system. 
If so, then the possibility of a certain form of technological descendant of current humans 
(posthumans) implies that intentional psychology will be instrumentally if not theoretically 
eliminated. 
That is, whatever its current value for humans, it could not play a similar role for the 
relevant class of posthuman. And this not because of any logical or ontological vices but 
because of it would be incapable of functioning as an idiom for interpretation and 
understanding among these hypothetical successors. So the anti-reductionist argument 
against theoretical reduction/elimination supports a metaphysical case for instrumental 
elimination. 
The hypothetical entities in question are what I refer to in Posthuman Life and elsewhere 
as “hyperplastic agents” (Roden 2014: 101-2). An agent is hyperplastic if it can make 
arbitrarily fine changes to any part of its functional or physical structure without 
compromising either its agency or its capacity for hyperplasticity. For example, suppose 
a hyperplastic agent dislikes some unpleasant memories associated with the taste of 
milk. Whereas a merely plastic agent like ourselves might need hours of cognitive 
behavioral therapy to excise these, the hyperplastic simply needs to locate the neuronal 
ensembles and pathways associated with these memories and ensure that they are no 
longer linked in such a way that the memory of milk causes them to activate in turn. 
Likewise, a hyperplastic would be in a position to alter any other informational or value-
relevant state by physically altering the relevant brain states. Obviously, use the term 
“brain” broadly here to refer to those systems within the hyperplastic that are associated 
with “cognition”, “perception” or the “control of behaviour” in some intuitive sense of 
these terms. The original inspiration for the idea of the hyperplastic came from Steve 
Omohundro’s speculations about the goal structures of generally intelligent robots in his 
essay “The Basic AI Drives” (2008). We need not assume that the “brain” in question is a 
known biological system. 
Davidson’s anti-reductionism implies token physicalism (each event that can be brought 
under a psychological description is identical to some physical event, since ontological 
physicalism is taken as a given). 
So for any state in an agent with a psychological description there will be physical 
description of that state. For any such state there will interventions that the agent can 
make into the state which will produce a physically distinct successor state such that the 
former psychological description will no longer be true of it. 
Now we can suppose that any hyperplastic agent will have an Agenda at a particular 
time. That is, it will not tinker with its internal states arbitrarily but wish to do so in ways 
that don’t kill it, do not undermine its capacity for hyperplasticity and that fulfill whatever 
desiderata are listed on the Agenda. 
The interesting question (assuming Davidsonian anti-reductionism) is how the Agenda 
can be formulated. Can it be expressed in psychological terms (roughly, in terms of 
propositional attitudes or values)? If it is expressed in psychological terms, then anti-
reductionism implies that for any Agent intervention at the physical level, it will not be 
possible to reliably infer the psychological outcome of the alteration. 
This follows simply because there are no psychophysical laws. Moreover even rough 
generalisations over past interventions would not be much help. These might be reliable 
for merely plastic creatures whose basic design and structure remain fairly constant over 
time. But a hyperplastic agent is protean. Thus it cannot assume that the rough and 
ready psychophysical generalisations that have held over one phase of its existence will 
extend into another phase. 
It follows that however a hyperplastic agent frames the Agenda it cannot be 
psychologically expressible because no reliable inferences can be drawn from future 
physical form to future psychology. 
So if hyperplastics have Agenda’s, they would have to represent states that could be 
reliably inferred from facts about their physical constitution at a given time. But given 
Davidson's anti-reductionism, they would have little use for psychological self-description 
for making generalisations about their current or future actions. Suppose a hyperplastic 
Agent self-attributes a belief b. A merely plastic agent like you or me might assume 
generalisations along the lines of “I will continue to hold b unless I find evidence from 
which some contrary of b can be inferred”. But a hyperplastic agent would not be able to 
assume such generalisations because there could be no evidence that an auto-
intervention would not cause it to lose b regardless of the evidence in its favour. 
So a hyperplastic agent could not use propositional attitude psychology to predict its own 
behaviour. Folk psychology would be equally impotent for predicting the behaviour of its 
fellow hyperplastics for the same reason. 
If hyperplastic agents could exist and plan their self-interventions, they would have to 
employ an entirely different idiom to understand themselves or one another. A 
posthuman-making disconnection that resulted in the emergence of hyperplastics would 
inevitably to result in the instrumental elimination of folk psychological capacities among 
the population of hyperplastics, at least; since neither the capacity nor the linguistic 
idiom for attributing propositional attitudes would have predictive or hermeneutic utility. 
This means that were humans to encounter hyperplastics, they would not be radically 
interpretable (in Davidson’s sense) because radical interpretation depends on the 
principle of charity and this, again, is framed in folk psychological terms. 
I conclude that if hyperplastic agents are possible, we could not understand them without 
abandoning the conceptual framework we currently use to understand ourselves and our 
conspecifics. They would be radically uninterpretable. 
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